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SYMPOSIUM

ISLAM AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE EXPERIENCE
OF RELIGIOUS MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES
Brett G. Scharffs*
INTRODUCTION
One of the most interesting stories in the history of religious freedom is the
journey of the Catholic Church, from being perhaps the most powerful institution on
earth opposed to religious freedom in the eighteenth and into the nineteenth
centuries, to being perhaps the most powerful institution on earth in defense of
religious freedom from the middle of the twentieth century and into the early decades
of the twenty-first century.1 Whereas in most countries today there is a very high
correlation between dominant religious majorities and a low degree of religious
freedom, regardless of whether the religious majority is Orthodox Christian,
Muslim, Buddhist, Jewish, or Hindu, there is a striking exception: in countries with
large Catholic majorities, limitations on religious freedom—measured both in terms
of legal restrictions and social hostilities—tend to be low or very low. 2
In an article in the Notre Dame Law Review celebrating the fiftieth anniversary
of Dignitatis Humanae, I documented this remarkable anomaly and suggested that
this was due to the Catholic Church’s journey toward finding within its own religious
tradition the theological resources for identifying freedom of religion as a basic
component of human dignity and thus a fundamental human right. 3 In a subsequent
article, Andrea Pin (whose article Is There a Place for Islam in the West?

© 2018 Brett G. Scharffs. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as
each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review Online, and
includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Director, International Center for Law and Religion Studies, Rex E. Lee Chair and
Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School. B.S.B.A., M.A., Georgetown
University; B.Phil (Rhodes Scholar) Oxford University; J.D. Yale Law School. Thanks to the
editors of the Notre Dame Law Review for the invitation to participate in this Online Symposium,
to Andrea Pin for his provocative Essay, and for our work together. Thanks also to my BYU Law
student, Adam Bouka, for research assistance.
1 See Brett G. Scharffs, Religious Majorities and Restrictions on Religion, 91 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1419, 1435 (2016).
2 See infra Part II.
3 See generally Scharffs, supra note 1, at 1435–41.
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Adjudicating the Muslim Headscarf in Europe and the United States 4 is the catalyst
for this Online Symposium) and I have further traced the development of this shift
in Catholic thinking.5
An important factor in the emergence of religious freedom as a core doctrine
of the Catholic Church was an increased appreciation within the Church of the
experience of Catholics in countries, such as the United States, where Catholics are
a minority rather than a majority of the population.6 As John Courtney Murray and
other American Catholic thinkers explained to their coreligionists, religious freedom
was very good for the Catholic Church in a place such as the United States where,
while the largest single denomination, Catholics represented only about a quarter of
the population and were minorities in a country where Protestants were the
majority.7 The history of the Catholic experience in America—a journey from being
a minority that suffered persecution and discrimination on account of religion to
being an accepted and ordinary part of the country’s religious landscape—had a
profound influence on Vatican thinking about religious freedom. 8
Professor Andrea Pin’s article, Is There a Place for Islam in the West?
Adjudicating the Muslim Headscarf in Europe and the United States, raises a related
question. The article contrasts recent court cases involving Islamic headscarves in
workplace settings, and notes that in the United States, the freedom to manifest one’s
faith by wearing a headscarf has been generally protected, whereas in Europe in two
recent cases the Court of Justice of the European Union declined to protect such
religious manifestations.9 The question raised is how the treatment of religious
freedom claims made by Muslims in places where Islam is a minority religion may
affect the trajectory of thinking about religious freedom in what is often called the
“Muslim world”—countries where Islam is not just the majority, but also the
overwhelmingly dominant religion.
The concern animating this contribution is that failing to protect the religious
freedom rights of Muslims in places where Islam is a minority religion will make it
more difficult for Islam, as the second largest of the world’s religions, 10 to embrace
a vision of religious freedom in places where it is a majority.
There are, of course, good reasons for thinking that the journey of Islam from
a religious institution that is powerfully opposed to religious freedom into one that
is supportive of religious freedom will not follow the same road as that traveled by

4 Andrea Pin, Is There a Place for Islam in the West? Adjudicating the Muslim Headscarf
in Europe and the United States, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2017).
5 See Brett G. Scharffs & Andrea Pin, Freedom for All: The Catholic Journey to Religious
Freedom and its Global Legacy (Sept. 9, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Notre Dame
Law Review Online). Some of the information in Parts II and III of this Essay are adapted from
Freedom for All.
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 See id.
9 See generally Pin, supra note 4.
10 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE: A REPORT ON THE SIZE
AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD’S MAJOR RELIGIOUS GROUPS AS OF 2010 9 (Dec. 2012)
[hereinafter
THE
GLOBAL
RELIGIOUS
LANDSCAPE],
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2014/01/global-religion-full.pdf.
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the Catholic Church. For one thing, Islam is much more diffuse as an “institution”
than the Catholic Church is, so even knowing who has the authority to speak on
behalf of Islam is more difficult to ascertain, which has the greatest implications for
Muslims themselves.11
Nevertheless, it seems likely that change in Islam will be affected both by
outside and internal sources, as was the case for the Catholic Church and its journey
to Dignitatis Humanae. However, one thing the Catholic experience suggests is that
meaningful and profound change does not simply come from outside pressures; it
comes from authentic and sincere evaluation and interpretation by insiders of a
religious tradition of that tradition itself. Thus, if Islam is going to come to embrace
religious freedom as an important value, this will be the result, significantly if not
primarily, of Muslims interpreting their own sacred texts, histories, traditions, and
legal systems.
Is such a journey possible or likely?
I.

SETTING THE STAGE

Despite the long history of religious freedom as a human right, laws throughout
the world vary widely in protecting freedom of religion and belief. Restrictions on
religious freedom are a global problem whose ramifications can cause social unrest
throughout the world, perhaps especially in Muslim countries. One of the key tenets
of Islam is proselytism, and so within Islam conversion to the religion is
unambiguously encouraged.12 Nevertheless, in some countries where the majority
of people are Muslim, conversion from Islam to another religion is strictly
forbidden.13 However, while several Muslim-majority countries have enacted laws
greatly favoring Muslim citizens to the detriment of non-Muslim citizens, other
Muslim-majority countries do not regulate worship. 14
The heterogeneity of positions regarding religious freedom in Muslim
countries may be attributed to a wide variety of factors such as the existence of
different branches of Islam15 and the absence of stable recognized religious
hierarchies within Islam.16 Some Muslims may quote the Quran to show Islam’s
support for religious freedom, saying, “[t]here shall be no compulsion in [acceptance
of] the religion,”17 and, “Say, O disbelievers. I do not worship what you worship.
11 See infra Part I.
12 See QURAN, sura An-Nahl 16:125 (“Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good
instruction . . . .”).
13 See Angelina E. Theodorou, Which Countries Still Outlaw Apostasy and Blasphemy?, PEW
RES. CTR. (July 29, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/29/which-countriesstill-outlaw-apostasy-and-blasphemy/.
14 See PEW RES. CTR., MANY COUNTRIES FAVOR SPECIFIC RELIGIONS, OFFICIALLY OR
UNOFFICIALLY
(Oct.
3,
2017),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/11/2017/09/29162847/FULL-REPORT-FOR-WEB.pdf.
15 See Amber Pariona, The Major Branches of Islam, WORLD ATLAS (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-major-branches-of-islam.html
(describing
and
distinguishing five branches of Islam).
16 See Dr. Hatem al-Haj, Religious Hierarchy in Islam, ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM JURISTS OF
AM. (Aug. 6, 2006), http://www.amjaonline.org/fatwa-1670/info.
17 QURAN, sura Al-Baqarah 2:256 (second alteration in original).
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Nor are you worshipers of what I worship. . . . For you is your religion, and for me
is my religion.”18 But others quote from the Prophet al-Bukhari—“the Prophet said,
‘If somebody (a Muslim) discards his religion, kill him’” 19—to justify suppression
of religious freedom. Consequently, despite the fact that some Muslims are strong
advocates of religious freedom, Muslim-majority countries are usually more
restrictive in matters of religious freedom than the rest of the world. 20
To understand the prospects for religious freedom within Islamic thinking, it
is helpful to get a better sense of the current state of affairs.
II.

RELIGIOUS MAJORITIES AND RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE
CATHOLIC ANOMALY

In April 2017, the Pew Research Forum reported that 40% of the world’s
countries (based on 2015 data) had high or very high overall restrictions on religious
freedom, an increase from 34% in 2014, with 60% having moderate or low
restrictions on religious freedom. 21 Because the countries with high or very high
restrictions include some with very large populations, such as India and China, these
countries include nearly four out of every five people (79%) in the world. Only 21%
of the world’s population live in countries with moderate or low restrictions on
religious freedom, a decrease from 26% in 2014. 22
A large majority of the countries with high or very high legal or social
restrictions on religion are places where the largest religious group represents either
a supermajority (which here is calculated as being over 70%) or at least a majority
(over 50%).23
A. Legal Restrictions on Religious Freedom
There is a high correlation between countries with high or very high legal
restrictions on religious freedom and countries where the dominant religious
majority group represents a supermajority of more than 70% of the population of

18
19
20
21

QURAN, sura Al-Kafirun 109:1–6.
MUHAMMAD AL-BUKHARI, SAHIH AL-BUKHARI vol. 4, bk. 52, no. 260.
See Scharffs, supra note 1, at 1423, 1425.
PEW RESEARCH CTR., GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE MODESTLY IN 2015,
REVERSING DOWNWARD TREND 4 (Apr. 11, 2017) [hereinafter GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON
RELIGION
RISE],
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/11/2017/04/24102207/Pew-Research-Center-Religious-Restrictions-2017FULL-REPORT.pdf.
22 Id. at 14. The percentage for high and very high restrictions are taken from page 14 of this
report. Id. at 14. The percentages for moderate and low restrictions are not specifically mentioned
in the report but are simply what remains. As the percentage for high and very high restrictions
increased by 5% from 2014 to 2015 (74% to 79%), the percentage for moderate and low restrictions
on religious freedom has subsequently decreased by 5%. See id. at 14–15.
23 See THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–50 (providing religious
composition of various countries). For an overview of the sources of Pew’s demographic data, see
GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, at 38–41. Primary sources “include
reports from U.S. government agencies, several independent, nongovernmental organizations and
a variety of European and United Nations bodies.” Id. at 38–39.
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that country.24 In the April 2017 Pew Report, there were twenty-three countries with
very high and twenty-seven countries with high government/legal restrictions on
religious freedom.25 Eighteen of the twenty-three countries with very high legal
restrictions have a dominant religious group of over 70%.26 Many of these countries
have a Muslim supermajority, but there is also one country with an Orthodox
Christian supermajority (Russia).27 Of the remaining five countries with very high
legal restrictions, the dominant religious group represents more than half of the
population in two: Eritrea and Malaysia.28
Twenty-three of the twenty-seven countries with high legal restrictions have a
dominant religious group of 70% of the population or higher. 29 This list is again
dominated by countries with a Muslim supermajority, but there is also a smattering
of countries with Christian, Hindu, Jewish, or Buddhist supermajorities. 30 Of the
remaining four countries with high legal restrictions, the dominant religious group
represents more than 60% of the population in three of them. 31
These correlations are striking. Of the fifty countries with high or very high
legal restrictions, forty-one have a dominant religious group of 70% or more of the
population, and five of the remaining nine have a dominant religious group of 60%
or more of the population.32 In all, forty-six of fifty countries with high or very high
legal restrictions have a dominant religious group representing more than 60% of

24 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50 (listing countries
with high and very high government restrictions on religion).
25 See id.
26 Id. at 15, app. A at 50; THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–50
(providing the religious composition of various countries).
27 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, at 15, app. A at 50 (listing
countries with very high government restrictions on religion); THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS
LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–50 (providing the religious composition of various countries).
Note that the data for Russia from this report were “[e]stimates based on [the] 2004 Generations
and Gender Survey, adjusted to account for underrepresented religious and projected to 2010.” Id.
at 78. More recent estimates are that between 42.5% and 68% of Russian are Orthodox Christians,
with several other Christian denominations at less than 5% each. See, e.g., BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RUSSIA 2014 INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2 (2014), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238638.pdf
(reporting various studies and surveys).
28 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, at 15, app. A at 50; THE
GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 46, 48 (providing the religious composition of
China, Eritrea, and Malaysia). China’s dominant religious group is technically unaffiliated with
52.2% of the population. Id. at 46.
29 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50 (outlining
countries with high legal restrictions); THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–
50 (providing the religious composition of different countries)
30 See id.
31 See GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50 (listing Qatar,
Laos, France, and Cuba as four of the twenty-seven countries with high government restrictions);
THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 46–47, 49 (providing that the dominant
religion accounts for more than 60% of the population in Qatar, Laos, and France).
32 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50 (listing countries
with very high and high government restrictions on religion).
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the population.33 Only four countries with high or very high restrictions (Cuba,
China, Singapore, and Vietnam) are countries where the dominant religious group
is less than 60% of the population.34
B. Social Hostilities Involving Religion
A similar pattern is evident in countries with very high or high social hostilities
involving religion and the existence of a majority religious group. According to the
2017 Pew Report, there are eleven countries with very high social hostilities
involving religion, and forty-two countries with high social hostilities. 35 There is
significant, but not absolute, overlap between countries with high or very high legal
restrictions and countries with high or very high social hostilities.36
Ten of the eleven countries with very high social hostilities have a dominant
religious group representing 70% or more of the population. 37 As we might expect,
this includes a number of Muslim-majority countries, but also countries with a Hindu
majority (India), a Jewish majority (Israel), and an Orthodox Christian majority
(Russia).38 Of the countries with very high social hostilities, only Nigeria does not
have a majority religious group of over 50%, and that country is almost evenly
divided between a Muslim-dominated northern half of the country and a Christiandominated southern half of the country, with the overall population of the country
almost evenly divided between Christians and Muslims. 39
33
34

See id.
See GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50; THE GLOBAL
RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 46, 49–50. Note that the Pew data for Cuba, placing the
“Mixed Christian” total for the country at 59.2%, is an “estimate[] based on [the] 2010 World
Religion Database.” Id. at 46, 72. Other sources, however, give a higher total. The Roman Catholic
Church, for example, estimates that 60% to 70% of the population of Cuba is Catholic (though
admittedly the number actually attending mass is much lower, perhaps as low as 4% to 5% of
nominal Catholics). See Geoff Thale, Comunidades de Fe en Cuba: Primera Parte de la Serie de
Fondo de WOLA Sobre la Religión en Cuba, WOLA (Mar. 26, 2012),
http://www.wola.org/es/comentario/comunidades_de_fe_en_cuba_primera_parte_de_la_serie_de
_fondo_de_wola_sobre_la_religion_en. However, “[t]here is no independent, authoritative source
on the overall size or composition of religious groups” in this Communist-controlled country.
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CUBA 2014
INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM
REPORT
1
(2014),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238748.pdf (providing data on Cuba).
35 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53 (listing countries
with high and very high social hostilities).
36 See id. app. A at 50, app. B at 53.
37 Id. app. B at 53 (listing countries with very high social hostilities); THE GLOBAL
RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–50 (providing the religious composition of different
countries).
38 Id.
39 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53 (listing Nigeria as
a country with very high social hostilities); THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10,
at 48 (providing the religious composition of Nigeria). The 2012 Pew Report (citing 2010 data)
reported that Nigeria was almost evenly divided between Christians (49.3%) and Muslims (48.8%).
See id. According to the U.S. State Department Report for 2014, “[m]ost observers estimate
approximately 50 percent of the population is Muslim and 50 percent Christian.” BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, NIGERIA 2014 INTERNATIONAL
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There is also a very strong correlation between high social hostilities and
countries where the dominant religious group is a majority or supermajority. Thirtythree of the forty-two countries with high social hostilities have a dominant religious
group with 70% or more of the population. 40 Of the remaining nine countries with
high social hostilities involving religion, all have a dominant religious group with
50% or more of the population. 41
These correlations once again are striking. Of the fifty-three countries with
high or very high social hostilities, forty-three have a dominant religious group of
70% or more of the population, and eight of the remaining ten have a dominant
religious group of 60% or more of the population. 42 In all, fifty-one of fifty-three
countries with high or very high social hostilities relating to religion have a dominant
religious group representing more than 60% of the population. 43 Only two countries
(Nigeria and Bosnia and Herzegovina) with high or very high social hostilities have
a dominant religious group that is less than 60% of the population.44
These statistics incline toward the conclusion that where there is a large
religious majority or supermajority this will almost always correlate with high or
very high legal and social restrictions on religion. But this is not the case, for there
is an important exception: the Catholic Church. Countries where the dominant
religious group is Catholic are noteworthy for their low legal restrictions as well as
low social hostilities regarding religion. 45
C. The Catholic Anomaly
Of the countries included in the Pew research, there are thirty-two countries
where Catholics represent a supermajority of 70% or more of the population. 46 In
none of these thirty-two countries are there high or very high legal restrictions on
RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM
REPORT
2
(2014),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238460.pdf.
40 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53 (listing the
countries with high social hostilities); THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–
50 (providing the religious composition of different countries).
41 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53; THE GLOBAL
RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–49. The religious balance in Bosnia and Herzegovina
is approximately 52% Christian and 45% Muslim. Id. at 45.
42 See GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53; THE GLOBAL
RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–49.
43 See GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53; THE GLOBAL
RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–49.
44 See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
45 See GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53; THE GLOBAL
RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–49.
46 PEW RESEARCH CTR., TABLE: CHRISTIAN POPULATION AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL
POPULATION BY COUNTRY (Dec. 19, 2011) [hereinafter CHRISTIAN POPULATION TABLE],
http://www.pewforum.org/2011/12/19/table-christian-population-as-percentages-of-totalpopulation-by-country/ (providing the Christian composition of different countries’ populations).
The Pew studies, using “censuses, surveys and official population registers,” are based on selfidentification of believers. THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 7. They do
“not attempt to measure the degree to which members of these groups actively practice their faiths
or how religious they are.” Id. at 15.
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religious freedom.47 Thirteen (Argentina, Austria, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea,
Italy, Mexico, Monaco, Panama, Peru, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, and Venezuela) of
the thirty-two countries with a Catholic supermajority have moderate legal
restrictions, and the remaining nineteen have low legal restrictions.48 Thus, while
eighteen of the twenty-three countries with very high legal restrictions on religion
have a dominant religious group with 70% or more of the population, 49 none of those
countries has a Catholic supermajority or Catholic majority. And while twenty-three
of the twenty-seven countries with high legal restrictions have a dominant religious
group of 70% or more,50 none of those countries has a Catholic supermajority, and
only two (Cuba and France) have a Catholic majority.51
The Catholic attitude toward minorities is not confined to the legal realm. Of
the thirty-two countries where Catholics represent more than 70% of the population,
none are countries where social hostilities involving religion are very high, and in
only four (Italy, Mexico, Slovakia, and the Philippines) are social hostilities high. 52
Social hostilities are moderate in eight and low in twenty of the thirty-two countries
with a Catholic supermajority.53 Therefore, in the thirty-two countries with a
Catholic supermajority, there are zero with very high social hostilities and only four
with high social hostilities.
Thus, while ten of the eleven countries with very high social hostilities toward
religion have a dominant religious group representing 70% or more of the
population,54 none of those countries has a Catholic supermajority. And while thirtythree out of forty-two countries with high social hostilities toward religion have a
dominant religious group with 70% or more of the population, only four of those
thirty-three countries (Italy, Mexico, Slovakia, and the Philippines) have a Catholic
supermajority.55 And while the remaining nine countries with high social
restrictions on religion have a dominant religious group representing between 50%
and 70% of the population, only one of those countries (France) has a Catholic
majority.56
This data suggests two interim conclusions. The first, which draws from the
statistics showing that religious majorities tend to oppress religious minorities either

47 See GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50; CHRISTIAN
POPULATION TABLE, supra note 46.
48 See CHRISTIAN POPULATION TABLE, supra note 46; GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION
RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50–51 (rating countries’ legal restrictions on religion).
49 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
50 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
51 See CHRISTIAN POPULATION TABLE, supra note 46; GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION
RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50.
52 See CHRISTIAN POPULATION TABLE, supra note 46; GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION
RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53.
53 See CHRISTIAN POPULATION TABLE, supra note 46; GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION
RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53 AT
54 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
55 See supra notes 42 and 48 and accompanying text.
56 See CHRISTIAN POPULATION TABLE, supra note 46 (providing that the Catholic
composition of France is 60.4%); GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app.
B at 53; THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–49; see also supra notes 32
and 44 and accompanying text.
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or both through legislation and societal restrictions, is that religion itself may be an
important category of limitation on religious freedom. A second interim conclusion,
which draws from the quite exceptional data concerning Catholic majority countries’
attitudes toward minorities, is that it may be within religious traditions themselves
that we will find the most effective resources for defending religious freedom.
III. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH’S VIEWS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE PREVATICAN II ERA
The Catholic Church as an institution has not always protected religious
freedom for all; it has taken a long journey toward embracing the ideal of religious
freedom regardless of faith.57 The Catholic Church’s historical trajectory shows that
religions can change and may come to embrace religious freedom in a way that
positively affects everybody, by reflecting upon their own doctrine.
Catholicism came to protect religious freedom late in modernity. The topic of
religious freedom had been widely known to the Catholic Church, as the Christian
faith was persecuted from its very beginning. 58 But the Catholic doctrine had
developed to the extent that, writing in 1791 at the time of the French Revolution,
Pope Pius VI viewed religious freedom as an assault on the Catholic Church, calling
it a “monstrous right” and an “imaginary dream[].” 59
The sharp critique of religious freedom was continued by Pope Gregory XVI’s
1832 encyclical Mirari Vos, which denounced religious freedom as leading to
“indifferentism” toward truth, stating, “[t]his shameful font of indifferentism gives
rise to that absurd and erroneous proposition which claims that liberty of conscience
must be maintained for everyone.”60 For Pope Gregory XVI, religious liberty led to
the false conclusion that one religion is as good as any other.61
A little over a decade later, in 1844, Pope Gregory XVI denounced Bible
societies that translated and distributed the Bible in vernacular languages, warning
about “indifference to religion propagated by the sect members under the name of
religious liberty.”62 He warned that if “complete liberty of conscience, as they call
it, spreads among the Italian people, political liberty will result of its own accord.”63
In 1864, Pope Pius IX issued his Syllabus Errorum (Syllabus of Errors),64
which included denunciations of indifferentism, communism, Bible societies, and
57
58

See Scharffs, supra note 1, at 1435–41.
See generally Everett Ferguson, Persecution in the Early Church: Did You Know?, IX
CHRISTIAN
HISTORY
(1990),
http://www.christianitytoday.com/history/issues/issue27/persecution-in-early-church-did-you-know.html (providing an overview of the persecution of
the Christian faith in the first three hundred years of the Church).
59 Pius VI, Encyclical Letter Quod Aliquantum, in RECUEIL DES ALLOCUTIONS
CONSISTORIALES 53–55 (Adrien Le Clere ed., 1865).
60 Gregory XVI, Encyclical Letter Mirari Vos ¶ 14 (Aug. 15, 1832),
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/greg16/g16mirar.htm.
61 See id. ¶ 13.
62 Gregory XVI, Encyclical Letter Inter Praecipuas ¶ 14 (May 8, 1844),
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/greg16/g16inter.htm.
63 Id.
64 Pius
IX,
Papal
Document
Syllabus
Errorum
(Dec.
8,
1864),
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/pius09/p9syll.htm.
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modern liberalism. Pope Pius IX declared it an error that, “in some Catholic
countries, that persons coming to reside therein shall enjoy the public exercise of
their own peculiar worship.”65 Also an error was that the Pope ought to reconcile
himself “and come to terms with progress, liberalism and modern civilization.” 66
In 1885, it was the turn of Pope Leo XIII. With his encyclical Immortale Dei:
On the Christian Constitution of States,67 Leo drew on previous papal
pronouncements, advocated for a special place for the Catholic Church’s teaching
in state laws, and repudiated religious freedom. He stated that “it [was] not lawful
for the State, any more than for the individual, either to disregard all religious duties
or to hold in equal favour different kinds of religion.” 68 More generally, he also
argued that “unrestrained freedom of thinking and of openly making known one’s
thoughts [was] not inherent in the rights of citizens, and [was] by no means to be
reckoned worthy of favour and support.”69
In 1892, Pope Leo XIII also warned Catholics not to fraternize with
Freemasons, namely “those who hide under the mask of universal tolerance, respect
for all religions, and the craving to reconcile the maxims of the Gospel with those of
the revolution.”70 In 1900, he reiterated this theme by declaring, “[t]he world has
heard enough of the so-called ‘rights of man.’ Let it hear something of the rights of
God.”71
IV.

U.S. ANTI-CATHOLICISM AND THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A CATHOLIC
DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Meanwhile, during much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century,
Catholics suffered discrimination and even persecution in the United States.72 Some
of the first major anti-Catholic outbursts occurred in the Northeast of the United
States from the 1830s to the 1850s, leading to the burning of Catholic property and
the killing of Catholics.73 Much of the violence and the anti-Catholic sentiments
were fed by claims that Catholics were destroying the culture of the United States.

65 Id. ¶ 78.
66 Id. ¶ 80.
67 Leo
XIII,
Encyclical
Letter
Immortale
Dei
(Nov.
1,
1885),
http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_lxiii_enc_01111885_immortale-dei.html.
68 Id. ¶ 35.
69 Id.
70 Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Custodi Di Quella Fede ¶ 15 (Dec. 8, 1892),
http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_08121892_custodidi-quella-fede.html.
71 Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Tametsi Futura Prospicientibus ¶ 13 (Nov. 1, 1900),
http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_01111900_tametsifutura-prospicientibus.html.
72 See Kenneth C. Davis, America’s True History of Religious Tolerance, SMITHSONIAN
MAG., Oct. 2010, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/americas-true-history-of-religioustolerance-61312684/.
73 See id.
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Irish Catholic immigrants were blamed for spreading violence and drunkenness. 74
Prominent Protestant leaders attacked the Catholic Church as theologically unsound
and an enemy of republican values.75 The Catholic Church’s official silence on the
subject of slavery also garnered the enmity of Northern Protestants toward
Catholics.76
In the 1920s, anti-Catholicism was widespread in the United States.77 The Ku
Klux Klan considered Catholicism to be incompatible with democracy and that
parochial schools encouraged a separatism that kept Catholics from being loyal
Americans.78 With the rapid growth of the second Ku Klux Klan, anti-Catholic
rhetoric intensified.79 On August 11, 1921, Father James E. Coyle was killed on his
rectory porch in Birmingham, Alabama, by a Southern Methodist minister, Rev.
Edwin R. Stephenson.80 The murder occurred just hours after Coyle had performed
a wedding between Stephenson’s daughter, Ruth, and Pedro Gussman, a Puerto
Rican immigrant.81 Several months before the wedding, Ruth had enraged her father
by converting to Roman Catholicism. 82 Stephenson was defended by Hugo Black,
a future Justice of the Supreme Court.83 In Alabama, Hugo Black was elected to the
U.S. Senate in 1926 after building a political base partially through his delivery of
148 speeches at local Klan meetings, where his focus was the denunciation of
Catholicism.84
The Jesuit theologian John Courtney Murray became cognizant of that antiCatholic fear.85 He realized the existence of understandable mistrust of motives that
many Americans had about the quickly growing American Catholic community. 86
Therefore, Murray began to develop a view based on the American view of a
separation of church and state.87 He developed the view of a religion-state
74 Maureen Fielder, Profiling American Muslims is Bigotry, Plain and Simple, NAT’L CATH.
REP. (July 1, 2016), https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/ncr-today/profiling-american-muslimsbigotry-plain-and-simple.
75 See W. JASON WALLACE, CATHOLICS, SLAVEHOLDERS, AND THE DILEMMA OF
AMERICAN EVANGELICALISM, 1835–1860 1–3 (2010).
76 See CHARLES E. CURRAN, THE SOCIAL MISSION OF THE U.S. CATHOLIC CHURCH: A
THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 3–4 (2011).
77 See Josh Zeitz, When America Hated Catholics, POLITICO MAG. (Sept. 23, 2015),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/09/when-america-hated-catholics-213177.
78 See Lynn Dumenil, The Tribal Twenties: ‘Assimilated’ Catholics’ Response to AntiCatholicism in the 1920s, 11 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 1, 21–49 (1991).
79 See Zeitz, supra note 77.
80 Sharon Davies, Tragedy in Birmingham, COLUMBIA MAG., March 2010, at 31.
81 Id.
82 See William H. Pryor, Jr., The Murder of Father James Coyle, the Prosecution of Edwin
Stephenson, and the True Calling of Lawyers, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 401,
403 (2006).
83 Davies, supra note 80.
84 See ROGER A. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 87, 104 (1997).
85 See Michael Tortolani, John Courtney Murray and the American Catholic Experience,
ACTON INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGION AND LIBERTY (1993), https://archive.li/jBSkA.
86 See id.
87 See Joslyn Ogden, Religious Liberty, Vatican II, and John Courtney Murray, in
INSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: CASE STUDIES IN ETHICS 6–7 (Kenan Inst. for Ethics at Duke Univ.,
2009), https://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Case-Study-Vatican-II.pdf.
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framework where a government limited by laws protects the liberty of all religious
communities equally, while the church pursues its aims by exercising its influence
in society without relying on government intervention to enforce the church’s
status.88 Consequently, by the 1950s,
Murray had written innovatively on the way the Catholic Church should interact
with the state (or, as he preferred to call it, the government). As a public
intellectual Murray had also been deeply engaged in debates with Protestant and
secular opinion-makers about the religious role of Catholicism in U.S. public life.
Catholics had long been held in suspicion by these opinion-makers, who feared
that the Catholic understanding of religious freedom was a threat to American
89
democracy.

Furthermore, Murray’s work
also addressed the internal reflection of the Catholic community on religious
freedom. This line of thinking surely had greater personal cost for Murray
because of the initial response of Church leadership to his thinking. In the end,
however, Murray’s theology helped bring about an extraordinary shift in the
Catholic Church’s stance toward religious freedom. Murray argued that attention
to the historical contexts of the rejection of religious freedom by nineteenth
century popes such as Pius IX and Leo XIII could enable the Church to affirm
religious freedom in contexts that were different, such as those prevailing in mid90
twentieth century democracies.

He helped the Church Fathers develop an understanding of freedom that did
not contradict the Catholic Church’s claim to carry the truth. 91 He was also able to
provide a historical perspective on the development of the Catholic doctrine of
religious freedom that avoided frictions between the bold affirmations of Dignitatis
Humanae and the nineteenth century’s quite different approach to the topic. 92
V.

VATICAN II

On December 7, 1965, His Holiness Pope Paul VI promulgated Dignitatis
Humanae: On the Right of the Person and of Communities to Social Civil Freedom
in Matters Religious.93 The declaration begins by noting that:
A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself more and
more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man, and the demand is
increasingly made that men should act on their own judgment, enjoying and

88 See id.
89 David Hollenbach, S.J., Religious Freedom, Morality and Law: John Courtney Murray
Today, 1 J. MORAL THEOLOGY 69, 70 (2012).
90 Id. at 71.
91 See id.
92 See id.
93 See generally SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM: DIGNITATIS HUMANAE: ON THE RIGHT OF THE PERSON AND OF COMMUNITIES TO
SOCIAL AND CIVIL FREEDOM IN MATTERS RELIGIOUS PROMULGATED BY HIS HOLINESS POPE
PAUL VI (Dec. 7, 1965) [hereinafter DIGNITATIS HUMANAE].
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making use of a responsible freedom, not driven by coercion but motivated by a
94
sense of duty.

The Second Vatican Ecumenical Council (“the Council”) declared the demand
for freedom of religion to be “greatly in accord with truth and justice.”95 The
declaration self-consciously searched “into the sacred tradition and doctrine of the
Church—the treasury out of which the Church continually brings forth new things
that are in harmony with the things that are old.”96 Thus, the declaration sought to
find within the Catholic tradition and doctrine, the doctrines and resources that
support the idea of freedom of religion. 97 The Council noted that “all men are bound
to seek the truth, especially in what concerns God and His Church, and to embrace
the truth they come to know, and to hold fast to it.”98 But such obligations fall to
human conscience.99 “The truth cannot impose itself except by virtue of its own
truth, as it makes its entrance into the mind at once quietly and with power.”100
Religious freedom, in turn, demands that men be permitted “to fulfill their duty to
worship God . . . with immunity from coercion in civil society.” 101 Thus, the
doctrine of religious freedom does not undermine “traditional Catholic doctrine on
the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one
Church of Christ.”102
Vatican II recognized that the truth exists in harmony with religious
freedom.103 Therefore,
[r]eligious freedom does not imply indifferentism, but rather creates a sphere of
personal responsibility wherein human beings can pursue the truth free from
physical and psychological coercion. Dignitatis Humanae is designed both to
appeal to public reason and to be rooted in the doctrinal understandings of true
Catholic faith. The understanding of human dignity becomes the wellspring from
104
which this powerful defense of religious freedom emerges.

The Second Vatican Council signaled the culmination of a dramatic change in
the Catholic Church’s perception of religious freedom.105 The right to religious
freedom is now viewed by the Catholic Church “as having ‘its foundation in the
dignity of the person.’”106 Furthermore, Catholics now view the doctrine of religious
freedom as being rooted in divine revelation and as a Christian duty to respect it
more conscientiously.107 This “[d]ivine revelation ‘gives evidence of the respect
which Christ showed toward the freedom with which man is to fulfill his duty of
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belief in the word of God and it gives us lessons in the spirit which disciples of . . .
[Christ] ought to adopt and continually follow.’” 108 Vatican II underlined the fact
that “[r]eligious freedom is not just compatible with Catholic doctrine; it is a tenet
of Catholic doctrine.”109
There are many factors that played a part in the Catholic Church’s journey to
Vatican II and its doctrinal embrace of freedom of religion as a basic component of
human dignity and as a fundamental human right. Some of these influences came
from outside the Church, while others came from within. Internal influences were
numerous and included the rise of personalism within the Catholic Church, the
influence of high-profile converts to Catholicism such as John Henry Newman, and
the Papal encyclical Immortale Dei.110 These influences have been described in
some detail by Brett Scharffs and Andrea Pin in a forthcoming article, Freedom for
All: The Catholic Journey to Religious Freedom and its Global Legacy.111
The influence I would like to emphasize here was that of American Catholics’
experiences with religious persecution, and the emphasis on the American
constitutional experience of separation of religion and the state. As religious
freedom of Catholics was protected under the U.S. Constitution, 112 a new model of
church-state relations became not only plausible but it reflected certain advantages.
Some prominent thinkers played an active role in inspiring the drafting of
Dignitatis Humanae. Among them stands out John Courtney Murray, an American
Jesuit priest who was able to articulate a defense of religious freedom with his works
and advised the Church Fathers during its elaboration. 113
Murray gave a twofold contribution: on one hand, he provided the Church
Fathers with an understanding of freedom that did not contradict the Catholic
Church’s claim to carry the truth; on the other hand, he was able to articulate a
narrative of the historical development of the Catholic doctrine of religious freedom
that avoided frictions between the bold affirmations of Dignitatis Humanae and the
nineteenth century’s quite different approach to the topic.
In 1965, while the declaration was in the process, Murray published The
Problem of Religious Freedom,114 a short book that looked at the idea of religious
freedom from a historical as well as theoretical perspective.
Historically, Murray did not hide that the Church’s experience of religious
freedom in the world was multifarious; “perhaps chiefly in Spain, the institution
[was] alien; the very notion connote[d] a hated Liberalismo, pernicious both to the
Church and to a cherished national religious unity.” 115 But the Church could not
simply ignore its missionary role and the diaspora of Catholics in non-Catholic
countries.116 More precisely, Murray emphasized that religious freedom had been
“an integral part of the Catholic experience in the United States” from which Vatican
108
109
110
111
112
113
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II had to take inspiration.117 The illuminating examples of the “American
Constitution (1789) and its Bill of Rights (1791)” had shifted the legal paradigm of
church and state relations from a “political and legal support of the exclusive rights
of truth” to a question of “religious freedom—personal, ecclesial, associational,
practical.”118
These historical considerations spurred Murray’s theoretical efforts. He
proceeded to distinguish between the juridical, the theological, and the ethical
problem of religious freedom.119 He addressed these three layers from two different
perspectives, which he saw as mutually alternative.
On one side stood what he called the First View.120 This view considered the
three layers jointly: the only correct exercise of freedom of conscience consisted in
adhering to truth; an erring conscience could only be tolerated by public powers; and
in fact, Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius XII both spoke of tolerance.121 On the legal
plane, this meant that “[t]he erroneous conscience ha[d] no right to external social
freedom. That is, it ha[d] no right to public expression or manifestation of its beliefs
in worship, witness, or teaching. In particular, it ha[d] no right publicly to propagate
or disseminate its belief.”122 Only the true religion had the right to be established as
it was divinely founded and ordained.123
In Murray’s eyes, this doctrine was not set in stone. It could be massaged—as
it had been, since Pope Leo XIII and the Popes who came after him did not explicitly
endorse the view that public power can legitimately “enforce outward conformity
with the official faith.”124
With what he called the Second View, Murray built up an intellectual
alternative from which the Church Fathers later drew. He considered freedom in
general “as a political end, along with justice[,]” 125 within which religious freedom
enjoyed a special place.126 And yet, religious freedom was strictly “a juridical or
constitutional concept,”127 which through the ages had made its way into national
constitutions.128 It was “an affair of the social and civil order; it [was] an immunity
that attache[d] to the human person within society, and it ha[d] its guarantee in civil
law.”129 The Second View “reject[ed] the opinion that public care of religion
necessarily mean[t], per se and in principle, a political and legal care for the
exclusive rights of truth and a consequent care to exterminate religious error.” 130
The new intellectual framework that Murray proposed for the political and
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constitutional spectrum did not justify an inferior treatment for non-Catholic
religions.
The Second View’s ramifications were particularly important for the Catholic
Church’s legal status and fostered an equalitarian treatment of religions on the State
side. The Church did not “demand, per se and in principle, a status of legal privilege
for herself. The Church demand[ed], in principle and in all situations, religious
freedom for herself and religious freedom for all men.”131
John Courtney Murray made another crucial distinction, which would bear
consequences on Vatican II’s reflections. It drew theoretical and practical lines
between state and society.132 The state was not an omnipotent agent, which was in
full control of the society itself: the state’s domain was to be found within society,
not to be identified with itself.133
Drawing the line between state and society laid down the foundation for a
crucial distinction, namely between public order and the common good.134 In
Murray’s view, the state was not supposed to take care of the common good, but
only of a part of it, which went under the name of public order. 135 The common
good included “all the social goods, spiritual and moral as well as material,” and its
pursuit “devolve[d] upon society as a whole.” 136 Public order, in turn, was “a
narrower concept.”137
According to Murray, human societies needed to allow the free exercise of the
freedom of conscience. “[A] true metaphysic of the human person[,]” according to
his thinking, considered “human existence [as] essentially social-historical
existence.”138 It was not “permitted to introduce a dichotomy into man, to separate
his personal-interior existence and his social-historical existence.”139 In other words,
freedom of conscience was not just a business for individuals, but a necessary
component of social life.
The statement that a person’s life could not be dichotomized into an interior
existence and an exterior one was particularly significant, and went hand-in-hand
with the idea of the state as only protecting public order instead of fostering the
common good broadly conceived. By denying the “separation of the personal-moral
and the social-juridical orders”140 and narrowing down the state’s power to preserve
the public order, Murray posited that the state could not simply stay out of a person’s
conscience: it also had “no power to coerce the social expression of the religious
conscience.”141
All things considered, for John Courtney Murray, “the state . . . [was]
competent to do only one thing in respect of religion, that [was], to recognize,
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guarantee, protect, and promote the religious freedom of the people.”142 The public
power was “not the judge of the truth or falsity of the norms whereby conscience is
formed.”143 The protection of conscience did not end within the internal forum of
the human soul; no religious truth could receive the state’s blessing. 144 Religious
freedom had to be acknowledged as “a human freedom in the external forum of
society.”145
VI.

ISLAM

The Catholic paradigm shift in matters of religious freedom is a noteworthy
example of how religious persecution and the experience of a religious minority with
the constitutional principle of religious freedom may lead a major religious group to
reevaluate its approach to religious freedom. One may hope that religious groups
such as Muslims will follow the Catholic example and become defenders of religious
freedom. As previously mentioned, the Catholic Church as an institution has not
always been an advocate of religious freedom for all.146 Dignitatis Humanae shows
that religions can change, and do so and come to embrace religion in a way that
positively affects everybody, by reflecting on their own doctrine. 147
The paradigm shift of the Catholic Church in regards to religious freedom was
partially caused by the experiences of persecution of Catholics in America, as well
as the experience of having their religious freedom recognized and protected.148 As
religious persecution of Muslim groups are on the rise in several places in the world,
such as Myanmar,149 we may ask whether Muslims will reconsider their approach to
religious freedom in the same way that the Catholic Church has become a strong
advocate of religious freedom.

142 Id. at 41.
143 Id. at 79.
144 See id.
145 Id. at 80.
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A. The Muslim Experience in France
1. The French Ban on Face-Covering Veils
Recent developments in French law show an intent to restrict Muslim religious
freedom.150 For example, “[o]n March 15, 2004, France passed Law No. 2004-228,
which provides that in public elementary schools, junior high schools and high
schools, students are prohibited from wearing signs or clothing through which they
exhibit conspicuously a religious affiliation.” 151
“On its face, this law affects all religions equally. In practice, however, this
law has most severely impacted Muslim students because it prohibits Muslim
schoolgirls from wearing headscarves to school.”152 A few months after passage of
the law, the Conseil d’Etat (the French Supreme Court on Administrative Matters)
upheld its constitutionality.153 It found that, “although it infringed on the ‘freedom
of thought, conscience, and religion,’ the restriction ‘was proportionate to the
general interest pursued’”—the respect of secularism in public schools. 154
Five years later, addressing both houses of French Parliament in a historic
Versailles venue, French President Nicolas Sarkozy denounced the burqa as a sign
of subjugation and of debasement that is not welcome on the French territory. 155 In
2010, the Law No. 2004-228 was broadened by the passage of the Law No. 20101192, which “banned the burqa and other full-face veils in all public places.”156
“Both the French Assembly and the French Senate overwhelmingly passed the ban,
which was ultimately approved by the Constitutional Council, France’s top legal
authority, on October 7, 2010. The law went into effect on April 11, 2011.” 157 It
imposes two types of punishment for the violation of the law against face-covering
veils: (1) a fine of 150 euros (approximately $190 USD) or a citizenship course for
a woman who wears a burka in public, and (2) one year in prison and a fine of
approximately 30,000 euros (about $37,000 USD) for anyone who compels a woman
to do so.158
When Law No. 2010-1192 passed, it was challenged in the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR). In the highly controversial decision S.A.S. v. France, the
ECtHR upheld the ban.159 The court focused on whether the law interfered with the

150 See Jessica Fourneret, Note, France: Banning Legal Pluralism by Passing a Law, 29
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 233, 235–36 (2006).
151 Jennifer Heider, Unveiling the Truth Behind the French Burqa Ban: The Unwarranted
Restriction of the Right to Freedom of Religion and the European Court of Human Rights, 22 IND.
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159 S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014).

96

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[VOL. 93

rights of the applicant to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression. 160
The court confirmed the existence of such a restriction.161 But this restriction of the
rights is required by law, so the question was whether it corresponded to a legitimate
aim and if the restriction was proportionate to that goal. 162 Thus, the court examined
the necessity of the measure.163
The ECtHR upheld the law but not on grounds of public order. 164 The French
government failed to demonstrate that the face veil caused a general threat against
public safety.165 However, the court found that the impugned ban could be regarded
as justified in its principle solely in so far as it sought to guarantee the conditions of
“living together.”166 Consequently, the court concluded that the ban imposed can be
regarded as proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation of the
conditions of “living together” as an element of the “protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.”167 This has been criticized as an expansion of the legitimate
bases for limitations on freedom of religion and belief beyond the grounds for
limitation enumerated in the European Convention on Human Rights. 168
2. The French Supreme Administrative Court’s Denial of Mabchour’s Citizenship
The ban on face-covering veils in the context of citizenship and immigration
policies creates further questions. 169 “On June 27, 2008, the French Supreme
Administrative Court denied citizenship to Mabchour on the basis of her alleged
submission to her husband and her lack of integration to French society.” 170
However, the woman speaks French fluently and had been living in France with her
French husband since 2000.171 The woman in question appealed to the Council of
State.172 Rejecting her appeal, the council invoked her imperfect integration into
French society because she had adopted a “radical” practice of her religion that was
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incompatible with an essential value of the French community: the principle of the
equality of sexes.173
The judgment did not make any explicit reference to the issue of clothing. 174
However, the fact that the plaintiff wore the burqa had been mentioned in a
submission of the Council of State.175 In the submission, an independent female
magistrate stated that the woman had come to the interview with the government
authorities fully covered in a robe from the Arabic peninsula and had refused to bare
her face even in front of female officers for purposes of identification. 176
“While it is undisputed that, pursuant to Article 21–4 of the French Civil Code,
it is within the jurisdiction of the French authorities to deny citizenship based on
lack of assimilation, this decision mark[ed] a significant evolution in French
citizenship law . . . .”177 It was the first time that French authorities had officially
characterized the unnamed “radical practice of a religion as incompatible with
French society.”178
By holding that Mabchour’s radical practice of her religion is incompatible with
the essential values of the French community, the Conseil d’Etat’s ruling
legitimize[d] the prejudiced assessments by the French authorities as to whether
applicants’ practice of Islam and its social corollaries conflict with French values
179
and amount to a lack of assimilation.

B. The Decisions of the European Court of Justice
The recent cases of Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions180 and Bougnaoui v.
Micropole SA181 further developed the caselaw on the protection of religious
manifestations by Muslims in Europe. Both Achbita and Bougnaoui dealt with the
application of the antidiscrimination provision in European Directive 2000/78182
regarding religious expression in the workplace. In both cases a female Muslim
employee was fired because of her decision to wear a religious headscarf—Achbita
in violation of her employer’s written policies183 and Bougnaoui because of
customer preferences not to work with somebody wearing a religious headscarf. 184
In Achbita, the court held that the termination was not direct discrimination because
the policy prohibited the expression of all political, philosophical, and religious signs
(not just the wearing of religious headscarves), but that it may have amounted to
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 166.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 165–66 (citations omitted).
178 Id. at 166.
179 Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
180 Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Sols. NV, 2017 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0157
(Mar. 14, 2017).
181 Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA, 2017 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0188 (Mar.
14, 2017).
182 See Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 Nov. 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 303/16) (establishing “a
general framework for equal treatment in employment and education” in the European Union).
183 Achbita, 2017 EUR-Lex at ¶¶ 13–16.
184 Bougnaoui, SA, 2017 EUR-Lex at ¶ 14.
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indirect discrimination if the neutral policy resulted in “a particular religion or belief
being put at a particular disadvantage.” 185 In Bougnaoui, the court found for the
Muslim woman and held that satisfying customer preferences “cannot be considered
a genuine and determining occupational requirement.”186
CONCLUSION
I have argued that the experience with religious freedom by a religious
minority can affect how coreligionists view religious freedom in a place where that
religion is a majority. The primary example I’ve cited is the experience of Catholics
in America, which became an important factor in the emergence of the Catholic
commitment to religious freedom that was manifested in Vatican II. The experience
of Muslims in countries where they are a minority, especially in Europe, does not
bode well for the prospect of European Muslims becoming a force for advocating
the benefits of religious freedom that will be persuasive to their coreligionists in
places where Muslims represent a majority. The experience of Muslims in America
may provide a more hopeful prospect, but the story here, too, is mixed at best.

185
186

Achbita, 2017 EUR-Lex at ¶ 45.
Bougnaoui, SA, 2017 EUR-Lex at ¶ 41.

